In _Aristotle’s Empiricism_, Jean De Groot argues that an important part of Aristotle’s natural philosophy has remained largely unexplored and shows that much of Aristotle’s analysis of natural movement is influenced by the logic and concepts of mathematical mechanics that emerged from late Pythagorean thought. De Groot draws upon the pseudo-Aristotelian_ Physical Problems_ XVI to reconstruct the context of mechanics in Aristotle’s time and to trace the development of kinematic thinking from Archytas to the Aristotelian _Mechanics_. She (...) shows the influence of kinematic thinking on Aristotle’s concept of power or potentiality, which she sees as having a physicalistic meaning originating in the problem of movement. De Groot identifies the source of early mechanical knowledge in kinesthetic awareness of mechanical advantage, showing the relation of Aristotle’s empiricism to more ancient experience. The book sheds light on the classical Greek understanding of imitation and device, as it questions both the claim that Aristotle’s natural philosophy codifies opinions held by convention and the view that the cogency of his scientific ideas depends on metaphysics. (shrink)

Examples are presented of Aristotle’s use of non-idealized mathematics. Distinctions Husserl makes in Crisis help to delineate the features of this empiricalmathematics, which include the non-persistence of mathematical aspects of things and the selective application of mathematical traits and proper accidents. In antiquity, non-abstracted mathematics was involved with practical sciences that treat motion. The suggestion is made that these sciences were incorporated by Aristotle into natural philosophy without first being abstracted as pure mathematics—a state of affairs not envisioned by Husserl, (...) for whom science recast natural ontology by means of the idealization of pure mathematics. The relation of empirical mathematics to life-world ontology is considered. (shrink)

It is shown that Aristotle’s references to automata in his biological treatises are meant to invoke the principle behind the ancient conception of the lever, i.e. that points on the rotating radius of a circle all move at different speeds proportional to their distances from the center. This principle is mathematical and explains a phenomenon taken as whole. Automata do not signify for him primarily a succession of material movers in contact, the modern model for mechanism. For animal locomotion and (...) embryological development, Aristotle models his dunamis concept on the idea of mechanical potential that the lever principle displays. (shrink)

Rethinking the meaning of mechanism in antiquity Content Type Journal Article Category Essay Review Pages 1-6 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9599-0 Authors Jean De Groot, School of Philosophy, Catholic University of America, 420 Michigan Ave., NE, Washington, DC 20064, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

Examples are presented of Aristotle’s use of non-idealized mathematics. Distinctions Husserl makes in Crisis help to delineate the features of this empiricalmathematics, which include the non-persistence of mathematical aspects of things and the selective application of mathematical traits and proper accidents. In antiquity, non-abstracted mathematics was involved with practical sciences that treat motion. The suggestion is made that these sciences were incorporated by Aristotle into natural philosophy without first being abstracted as pure mathematics—a state of affairs not envisioned by Husserl, (...) for whom science recast natural ontology by means of the idealization of pure mathematics. The relation of empirical mathematics to life-world ontology is considered. (shrink)

Modern commentators have doubts about the authenticity and cogency of the early propositions of Archimedes’ On Equilibrium of Planes Book 1. Ernst Mach famously said that the proof of Prop. 6, the so-called law of the lever, assumes what is to be proven. Comparing the initial text in Heiberg’s modern edition (1881, 1913) to the first propositions in Eutocius’ commentary on EP 1, J. L. Berggren ([1976]. ‘Spurious Theorems in Archimedes’ Equilibrium of Planes: Book I’, Archive for History of Exact (...) Sciences 16.2 (1976), 87–103.) claimed that the propositions up through Proposition 3 of the standard modern edition are schoolbook additions written by an ancient author inferior to Archimedes. The present paper argues for the logical connectedness of Postulates 1–5 to Props. 1–6, by means of a detailed examination of the course of the argument and a re-examination of Eutocius’ remarks. The paper reinterprets the role of the empirical in the early propositions and offers a reading of the contribution of Archimedes’ mechanics to the method of EP 1. (shrink)

"This book collects essays by leading scholars, both American and European, on the American understanding of nature from Emerson to Dewey and beyond. The volume features essays on Emerson and Thoreau, Royce, Peirce, Wright, James, Holmes, Tocqueville, and Dewey. Topics include the role of nature in American idealism, the influence of Darwin, naturalism in psychology, and human nature in political thought. The final essay presents a comprehensive taxonomy of views of nature in relation to expressions of nature in American art." (...) "With its focus on philosophy of nature, this book fills a gap in the ongoing reassessment of nineteenth-century American philosophy, and it opens the way to further study of the role played by reflection on nature in the emergence of the American mind."--Jacket. (shrink)

This paper traces the significance of first principles in Greek philosophy to cognitive developments in colonial Greek Italy in the late fifth century BC. Conviction concerning principles comes from the power to make something true by action. Pairing and opposition, the forerunners of metonymy, are shown to structure disparate cultural phenomena—the making of figured numbers, the sundial, and the production, with the aid of device, of fear or panic in the spectators of Greek tragedy. From these starting points, the function (...) of the gnômôn in knowledge is explored. (shrink)

Originally published in 1991. Philoponus’ long commentary on Aristotle’s definition of light sets up the major concerns, both in optics and theory of light, that is discussed here. Light was of special interest in Neoplatonism because of its being something incorporeal in the world of natural bodies and therefore had a special role in the philosophical analysis of the interpenetration of bodies and also as a paradigm for the soul-body problem. The material investigated in this book contains much about the (...) physiology of vision as well as the propagation of light. Several chapters investigate the philosophical theory and its origins in ‘multiplication of species.’ These issues in the history of science philosophy are looked at further and an analysis is offered of the development of the distinction between Aristotle’s kinesis and energeia. The book covers a substantial amount of the philosophy of mathematical science from the point of view of Philoponus, drawing on more of his works relating to three dimensionality. (shrink)

QUINE'S DOCTRINE of the indeterminacy of translation is made possible by the principle of substitution characteristic of extensional logic. The same characteristic makes it impossible, in philosophy of science, to choose among theoretical models no one of which is obviously best suited to explain the facts. Hilary Putnam achieved a sort of closure to the problem of reference in philosophy of science, when he pointed out the implications of the Skolem-Löwenheim theorem. He said that besides the facts a theory is (...) designed to explain, there are any number of unintended interpretations of the same theory that assign the correct truth values to all sentences of the theory. There can be no sound basis for deciding upon the sole interpretation for a theory. Following Putnam, some philosophers have abandoned the problem of reference in the context of axiomatic systems. Ian Hacking, for instance, prefers a notion of reference "that is not tied by any specific, binding theory about what is referred to." He has turned to the study of approximations and practical models, spurred on by the difficulty of reconciling axiomatic systems to scientific practice. (shrink)

In the introduction to An Approach to Aristotle’s Physics, David Bolotin presents an exceptionally clear account of the difficulties of making a claim for Aristotle’s natural philosophy as a contemporary teacher about nature. Modern science has repudiated the chief elements of the Aristotelian cosmos—the geocentric universe, the account of projectile motion—and so the contemporary interpreter treats Aristotle as a brilliant expositor of the world “as it appears.” Alternatively, the interpreter may say there is no final truth in the matter of (...) nature, so Aristotle’s cosmos within its own perspective was as compelling as our modern science is within its own perspective. Neither of these interpretations suits Aristotle, Bolotin says, since the philosopher’s conception of science included its being a true account of nature itself. (shrink)

QUINE'S DOCTRINE of the indeterminacy of translation is made possible by the principle of substitution characteristic of extensional logic. The same characteristic makes it impossible, in philosophy of science, to choose among theoretical models no one of which is obviously best suited to explain the facts. Hilary Putnam achieved a sort of closure to the problem of reference in philosophy of science, when he pointed out the implications of the Skolem-Löwenheim theorem. He said that besides the facts a theory is (...) designed to explain, there are any number of unintended interpretations of the same theory that assign the correct truth values to all sentences of the theory. There can be no sound basis for deciding upon the sole interpretation for a theory. Following Putnam, some philosophers have abandoned the problem of reference in the context of axiomatic systems. Ian Hacking, for instance, prefers a notion of reference "that is not tied by any specific, binding theory about what is referred to." He has turned to the study of approximations and practical models, spurred on by the difficulty of reconciling axiomatic systems to scientific practice. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Edited by Jean De Groot 7a Nature in American Philosophy. The Catholic University of America Press, 2004 κ-—ι and scientific thought in the mid-19 century and the significant role played ^ by Chauncey Wright. But it is not clear how this bears on the question of nature as a philosophical concept, unless one assumes that science itself bears some special relation to the knowledge of nature. This, (...) however, would be to beg the philosophical question. If, for example, nature is defined as that to which only natural science has access, then to discuss science and its development has an obvious point. But if we are to understand nature more broadly, for example as "whatever is in whatever way," to use Justus Buchler's expression, then to speak about the development of science is no more directly relevant to an unfolding understanding of nature than to speak about the development of poetry. The point is not that an examination of Wright's conception of science is not significant, but simply that it is not equivalent to a discussion of Wright's conception of nature. Despite these concerns, the book is a strong one, both because the idea of a collection of essays on the concept of nature in American thought is a good one, and because the essays themselves are aU interesting and instructive. Of particular interest are the essays that expand the usual scope of discussions of American philosophy, in particular Mansfield on Tocqueville and Rescher on art. Mansfield is interested in the way Tocqueville makes use of, or better resists, the prevalent conceptions of nature in his understanding of democracy. In short, political thinking of his time was likely to have recourse to nature either in the sense of the "state of nature" or in the sense of the inherent characteristics of things, as in the "nature of" something. Mansfield argues that Tocqueville rejected both of these conceptions of nature in his attempt to understand democracy, the first being too prone to chaos and the second being too deterministic. Tocqueville did not describe democracy as natural, but rather as a "providential fact." The bulk of this very interesting essay is an exploration of what Tocqueville may have meant by a "providential fact," and how he understood democracy in relation to nature and providence. In his piece on American art Rescher is interested in the ways in which the varying conceptions of nature have been expressed in the visual arts, primarily painting but also sculpture. The book includes several black and white reproductions that Rescher uses to illustrate his points. We see, for example, a painting from the Hudson River School in which the natural environment is an overwhelming presence by comparison with a small cabin in a field and a barely visible horse and rider. Other prints from other periods and schools illustrate a natural environment dominated by human artifice, for better or worse, or depict a more harmonious integration of nature and technology. We also see an example of the romantic sense of nature pervaded by value, in this case beauty, in one of James Audubon's paintings of hummingbirds. In works of more recent vintage we see expressions of g^7 ^0 human alienation from nature and nature as transfigured by social develop- ^ ment. Rescher's discussion and examples do not debate the relative merits of ^-, the various perceptions of nature and its relation to human being, though in ^ the end he does urge on us an "enlightened pragmatism" that will treat ^ nature not simply as the environing condition in which people act, but as a source of value and an ideal. In this respect Rescher ends the book at a point not dissimilar from where it began with Goodman's account of Emerson and Thoreau. Nature in American Philosophy is on the whole a book that rewards the reader's close attention. As an exploration of a central theme in American philosophy it is to be welcomed. There should be more like it. John Ryder The State University of New York, [email protected] Translated, and with an introduction by Ramon Del Castillo La Opinion Publica y Sus Problemas (Spanish Translation of The Public and Its... (shrink)

Résumer pour des lecteurs de langue française le noble livre qu'ont publié l'an dernier John King-Farlow et William N. Christensen sur les rapports de la foi — entendez la foi Judéochrétienne — et la raison vivante — entendez la raison telle que la cultive de nos jours la philosophic analytique — n'est certes pas chose aisée, surtout quand le rédacteur de la chronique a été nourri et éduqué, comme c'est le cas, dans la tradition de la philosophic française! En (...) effet Faith and the Life of Reason procède d'une série d'articles qui ont paru successivement, au cours des quinze dernières années, dans d'importantes revues américaines, irlandaises ou anglaises et dont ce nouvel ouvrage constitue en quelque sorte la reprise, en même temps que la refonte, selon une perspective ordonnée. (shrink)

While Aristotle is mostly famous as the father of natural teleology, De Groot sets out to offer us a picture of the “other,” hitherto neglected Aristotle, whose natural science is thoroughly influenced by mechanistic procedures and ideas. Her monograph is impressive: it provides a wealth of detailed and philosophically rich discussions of sometimes overlooked Aristotelian texts, diagrams, and tables that help visualize the often technical materials she discusses, and bold and original claims that will perhaps not convince everyone, but (...) that will need to be taken into account in future studies of Aristotle’s natural philosophy. By drawing attention to the operation of mechanical notions... (shrink)

According to a generally held impression, which has coalesced out of centuries of misinterpretation occasioned mostly by misguided charitable commentary, but often by outright hostility to his followers (and occasionally deliberate misrepresentation of his ideas), Aristotle is a teleological (as opposed to “mechanistic”) philosopher, responsible for a “qualitative” (as opposed to quantitative) approach to physics that is thereby inadequately mathematical, whose metaphysical speculations, as absorbing as they continue to be even for contemporary and otherwise ahistorical analytical metaphysicians, are essentially devoid (...) of the virtues that determine the success of our modern sciences, which are in fact the result of overthrowing Aristotelian views. Jean De Groot’s monograph Aristotle’s Empiricism: experience and mechanics in the 4th century BC should completely wipe away that impression, as she offers an extremely attractive interpretation of Aristotle and his methods to replace it. This is a groundbreaking and exciting work, brimming with insights won from close and careful readings of both well-known and obscure passages of the Aristotle Corpus. It is an instant classic of Aristotle studies that should not only change the image of Aristotle’s role in the history of science but also set the agenda for much of the future research in every area of his theoretical sciences, including metaphysics, mathematics, and natural science. Thus although my primary goal in this review is to summarize its contents and try to give an idea of the richness, depth, and breadth of de Groot’s project, I will mention at the end what I think are the most important ways that the research should be developed and extended—the next areas of Aristotle studies that should incorporate these views and methods. (shrink)

Many studies claim to measure decision-making under risk by employing the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) scale, a self-report measure, or the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART), a behavioural task. However, these tasks do not measure decision-making under risk but decision-making under uncertainty, a related but distinct concept. The present commentary discusses both the theoretical and empirical basis of the distinction between uncertainty and risk from the viewpoint of several scientific disciplines and reports how many studies wrongfully employ the DOSPERT scale and (...) BART as risk-taking measures. Importantly, we call for proper distinguishing between (tasks measuring) decision-making under uncertainty and decision-making under risk in psychology and related fields. We believe this is vital as research has shown that people’s attitudes, behaviour, and brain activity differ between both concepts, indicating that confusing the concepts may lead researchers to erroneous conclusions. (shrink)

We introduce non-associative linear logic, which may be seen as the classical version of the non-associative Lambek calculus. We define its sequent calculus, its theory of proof-nets, for which we give a correctness criterion and a sequentialization theorem, and we show proof search in it is polynomial.

In their interesting paper, Susser and Cabrera (2024) apply the contextual integrity framework to brain data and mental privacy. This framework, developed by Nissenbaum (2009) and rooted in digital...

We investigate bisimulations for instantial neighbourhood logic and an \-indexed collection of its fragments. For each of these logics we give a Hennessy-Milner theorem and a Van Benthem-style characterisation theorem.

The authors investigate MacCormick and Weinberger's claim that the Institutional Theory of Law provides a conceptual framework for the study of legal phenomena from a socio-legal point of view. They evaluate this claim by confronting both the Institutional Theory of Law and Weinberger's theory of action with two approaches in socio-legal theory, i.e. the instrumentalist and the constitutive approach. The conclusion is that the Institutional Theory of Law lends itself to empirical research from an instrumentalist perspective, for both place the (...) concept institution in the context of law. Weinberger's theory of action may provide a basis for empirical research from a constitutive perspective. The authors make some suggestions for refinement of Weinberger's theory of action in order that the relation between institutions and action can be labeled dynamic. (shrink)

BackgroundThis article is part of a study to gain insight into the decision-making process by looking at the views of the relatives of potential brain dead donors. Alongside a literature review, focus interviews were held with healthcare professionals about their role in the request and decision-making process when post-mortal donation is at stake. This article describes the perspectives of the relatives.MethodsA content-analysis of 22 semi-structured in-depth interviews with relatives involved in an organ donation decision.ResultsThree themes were identified: ‘conditions’, ‘ethical considerations’ (...) and ‘look back’. Conditions were: ‘sense of urgency’, ‘incompetence to decide’ and ‘agreement between relatives’. Ethical considerations result in a dilemma for non-donor families: aiding people or protecting the deceased’s body, especially when they do not know his/her preference. Donor families respect the deceased’s last will, generally confirmed in the National Donor Register. Looking back, the majority of non-donor families resolved their dilemma by justifying their decision with external arguments. Some non-donor families would like to be supported during decision-making.DiscussionThe discrepancy between general willingness to donate and the actual refusal of a donation request can be explained by multiple factors, with a cumulative effect. Firstly, half of the participants stated that they felt that they were not competent to decide in such a crisis and they seem to struggle with utilitarian considerations against their wish to protect the body. Secondly, non-donor families refused telling that they did not know the deceased’s wishes or contesting posthumous autonomy of the eligible. Thirdly, the findings emphasise the importance of Donor Registration, because it seems to prevent dilemmas in decision-making, at least for donor families.ConclusionDiscrepancies between willingness to consent to donate and refusal at the bedside can be attributed to an unresolved dilemma: aiding people or protect the body of the deceased. Non-donor families felt incompetent to decide. They refused consent for donation, since their deceased had not given any directive. When ethical considerations do not lead to an unambiguous answer, situational factors were pivotal. Relatives of unregistered eligible donors are more prone to unstable decisions. To overcome ambivalence, coaching during decision-making is worth investigation. (shrink)

Over 30 million people worldwide have taken a commercial at-home DNA test, because they were interested in their genetic ancestry, disease predisposition or inherited traits. Yet, these consumer DNA data are also increasingly used for a very different purpose: to identify suspects in criminal investigations. By matching a suspect’s DNA with DNA from a suspect’s distant relatives who have taken a commercial at-home DNA test, law enforcement can zero in on a perpetrator. Such forensic use of consumer DNA data has (...) been performed in over 200 criminal investigations. However, this practice of so-called investigative genetic genealogy raises ethical concerns. In this paper, we aim to broaden the bioethical analysis on IGG by showing the limitations of an individual-based model. We discuss two concerns central in the debate: privacy and informed consent. However, we argue that IGG raises pressing ethical concerns that extend beyond these individual-focused issues. The very nature of the genetic information entails that relatives may also be affected by the individual customer’s choices. In this respect, we explore to what extent the ethical approach in the biomedical genetic context on consent and consequences for relatives can be helpful for the debate on IGG. We argue that an individual-based model has significant limitations in an IGG context. The ethical debate is further complicated by the international, transgenerational and commercial nature of IGG. We conclude that IGG should not only be approached as an individual but also—and perhaps primarily—as a collective issue. There are no data in this work. (shrink)